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 Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of how alternative models of the business cycle can replicate 
the stylized fact that large governments are associated with less volatile economies. Our 
analysis shows that adding nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to an otherwise 
standard RBC model can generate a negative correlation between government size and the 
volatility of output. However, in the model, we find that the stabilizing effect is only due to a 
composition effect and it is not present when we look at the volatility of private output. Given 
that empirically we also observe a negative correlation between government size and the 
volatility of consumption, we modify the model by introducing rule-of-thumb consumers. In 
this modified version of our initial model we observe that consumption volatility is also 
reduced when government size increases in similar way to the observed pattern in OECD 
economies over the last 45 years. 
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a study of how alternative models of the business cy-
cle can replicate the stylized fact that across countries and even across U.S.
states large governments are associated with less volatile economies. There is
substantial evidence that countries or regions with large governments display
less volatile economies, as shown in Galí (1994) and Fatás and Mihov (2001).
This is not only an intriguing fact for macroeconomists, but also one that has
implications regarding the models we use to analyze economic fluctuations.
As it is the case that most macroeconomic theories incorporate governments
in one form or another (expenditures, transfers or taxes), understanding this
correlation is crucial to improve the ability of models to replicate the stylized
facts of the business cycle.
The approach of this paper is to explore alternative theories and probe into the
different mechanisms that may explain why government size can have an effect
on the volatility of output fluctuations. Although we replicate and present
some of the evidence provided by previous papers in the literature, our goal is
not to challenge or qualify this empirical fact. We take as given that the size of
governments is inversely correlated with the volatility of business cycles and
we look for an explanation. Finding this explanation is a challenging task given
that, as shown by Galí (1994), there is no clear connection between government
size and volatility in the context of a standard RBCmodel. In fact, under some
reasonable assumptions, that model produces a positive correlation.
Our paper, by clearly illustrating the mechanisms behind the effects of taxes
and government spending on macroeconomic outcomes under different theo-
retical assumptions, can be useful in discriminating among different business
cycle models. We compare the predictions of a standard RBC model to those
of models that incorporate nominal rigidities, costs of adjustment for capital
and rule-of-thumb consumers. There are several reasons why we consider a
framework in which several frictions are present. First, these are models that
are more likely to generate the type of Keynesian effects observed in the data.
For example, adding costs of adjustment to capital is a way of making invest-
ment less reactive to technology shocks and, as a result, replicate better the
behavior in the data. A second reason for looking into this class of models
is that they are increasingly being used by researchers who struggle to ex-
plain other puzzles also related to fiscal policy. For example, there is evidence
that consumption increases in response to exogenous increases in government
spending (see Fatás and Mihov, 2002, or Perotti, 2002). This fact, which is
again at odds with the standard RBC model, has been partially accounted for
in a recent paper by Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) using a model with
similar features to the ones we explore in our paper.
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From an empirical point of view, understanding the implications of the cor-
relation between government size and output volatility is important for the
design of stabilizing fiscal policies. The fact that larger governments are asso-
ciated with lower volatilities can lead to the easy temptation of arguing that
this is the result of automatic stabilizers but to be able to make that assertion
one first needs to understand the stabilizing properties of large governments
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
Our main findings are the following. First, our analysis shows that adding
nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to an otherwise standard
RBC model can generate a negative correlation between government size and
the volatility of output. However, in the model, we find that the stabilizing
effect is only present because of a composition effect, given that larger govern-
ments are not associated, in the calibrated model, with more stable private
consumption or investment. In fact, as government size increases, these two
components of aggregate expenditure become more volatile. There is still an
interesting interaction between the degree of rigidities and the volatility of
these two components of GDP. As we increase the degree of rigidities in the
model, the increase in the volatility of consumption and investment as govern-
ment size increases is smaller. This interaction is, nonetheless, of second order
importance since we observe a negative correlation between government size
and the volatility of both components.
Given that empirically we observe that consumption volatility is also nega-
tively correlated with government size, we explore and additional variation of
the initial model in which we introduce rule-of-thumb consumers in an attempt
to have consumption closely mimic the response of GDP. In this modified ver-
sion of our initial model we indeed observe that consumption volatility is also
reduced when government size increases.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the basic
empirical evidence about the negative correlation between government size
and output and consumption volatility. In the third section we describe our
model with nominal and real rigidities. Its main implications in terms of the
relationship between government size and macroeconomic volatility are ex-
plored in Section 4, where we also extend our basic model to the inclusion of
rule-of-thumb consumers to better account for the empirical evidence. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
We first present evidence of the negative correlation between government size
and business cycle volatility for a sample of 20 OECD countries over the
3
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period 1960 to 2004. This correlation has been documented by, among others,
Galí (1994) and Fatás and Mihov (2001). We measure government size by
the GDP share of total government expenditures (G/Y ). 1 When it comes
to output volatility, we follow an eclectic approach and use four alternative
measures that use different detrending methods. Besides government size we
have considered the effect of some additional variables such as openness, the
average log of GDP per capita, the average log of GDP over the sample period
and the average rate of growth of GDP per capita. Only the average log
of GDP (lnY ) turns out to be statistically significant in all regressions and
hence we include it in the regressions in Table 1 as a proxy for the size of the
economy. Column (1) uses the log of the standard deviation of GDP growth
rates (∆ lnY ) as a measure of output volatility, whereas in column (2) we
are using the standard deviation of the GDP per capita growth rates (∆ ln y);
both these volatilities are negatively correlated with the variable G/Y. 2
The reduced-form approach of columns (1) and (2) has a difficult interpre-
tation because of the possibility of misspecifications in the regression. For
example, it could be that differences in volatility across OECD countries are
not driven by business cycle phenomenon but by transitional growth dynamics
that become part of the measured volatility because we are looking at devi-
ations around a flat trend (when using growth rates). A way of dealing with
the influence of transitional dynamics in our measure of volatility is to use the
cyclical component of the GDP (in logs), obtained with the HP filter and a
smoothing parameter equal to 10 since we are using annual data (see Baxter
and King, 1999, and Maravall and del Rio, 2001). In column (3) the dependent
variable is the log of the standard deviation of the output gap (Y c), whereas
in column (4) is the log of the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of GDP per capita (yc). We need to stress that in all cases, the coefficient of
1 All the data come from various issues of the Economic Ourlook dataset in the
OECD Statistical Compendium by DSI Data Service and Information, with the
exception of the GDP share of total government expenditures for Turkey that comes
from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The dataset as well as the technical
appendix with the model solution, the equilibrium, the steady state and the dynamic
system can be downloaded from:
http://iei.uv.es/rdomenec/ADFatas/ADFatas.html
2 Notice that we use ∂ lnσ/∂(G/Y ) as a measure of the effects of the changes in
government size on the standard deviation (σ) of the different variable considered in
Table 1. There are several reasons for this choice. First, G/Y has been the standard
regressor in the previous literature. Second, in the model presented in the next
section the simulations indicate that ∂ lnσ/∂(G/Y ) is not affected by changes in
G/Y within the range usually observed in the data. Finally, since for any given
value of G/Y the simulations in Tables 3 to 5 show that the standard deviation
of output and consumption are very sensitive to nominal and real rigidities, which
means that using the log transformation (lnσ) provides a more reliable measure of
how the effects of government size change for different degrees of rigidities.
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G/Y is negative and very significant.
There is also the possibility of reverse causation in this regression. The reverse
causation can bias our results in many directions. For example, it could be that
economies that are very volatile (for example because they are very open) will
have larger governments that serve as an insurance against cyclical shocks
(see Rodrik, 1998). If this were the case, the coefficient in the regressions
above would be biased towards zero. The possibility of endogeneity in this
specification is dealt with in detail in Fatás and Mihov (2001), who show that
after controlling for endogeneity, the negative correlation is still present and,
in some cases, becomes more significant (from both an economic and statistical
point of view).
In columns (5) and (6) we present the correlation between the log of the
standard deviation of the cyclical component of private consumption (both in
levels, Cc, and in per capita terms, cc) and government size. As it is clear from
both columns, there is also a negative and significant correlation between
both variables, suggesting that the results of columns (1) to (4) cannot be
explained solely by the composition effect of aggregate demand as the share
of public consumption becomes larger. The magnitude of the semi-elasticity
of the standard deviation of consumption to government size is similar to the
one we obtain in the case of output.
A possible explanation of the preceding result is that the lower volatility of
consumption is due to lower wage volatility. To check this possibility, the
dependent variable in column (7) is the log of the standard deviation of the
cyclical component of the real compensation per employee in the business
sector (wc). As we can observe, there is a negative and significant relationship
between this variable and government size.
In the last column of Table 1 we check for the effects of G/Y on the log of
the standard deviation of the cyclical component of private investment in per
capita terms (ec). The results indicate a negative and statistically significant
relationship between both variables. Finally, we have analyzed the relationship
between the volatility of government expenditures and government size. In our
sample of countries the correlation between the averages of these variables from
1960 to 2004 is positive (0.31) although not significant.
We have also analyzed the correlation between these volatilities and govern-
ment size for a different sample size. Thus, for the period 1960 to 1979 the
coefficient of G/Y in a regression for the volatility of yc is −2.64, very similar
to the coefficient reported in column (4) of Table 1. The same results are ob-
tained for other measures of output volatility. To what extend changes in the
government size are responsible for the documented reduction in the volatility
of output observed in some countries from 1980 onwards (see, among oth-
5
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Table 1
Government size and output volatility in the OECD, 1960-2004
Dependent variable: log of the standard deviation of
∆ lnY ∆ ln y Y c yc Cc cc wc ec
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
G/Y -2.55 -2.71 -2.65 -2.83 -2.58 -2.71 -3.08 -2.12
(4.56) (4.86) (4.97) (5.43) (3.04) (3.29) (3.07) (2.85)
lnY -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17
(2.17) (2.76) (2.82) (3.35) (3.36) (3.63) (3.64) (4.50)
R
2
0.513 0.561 0.573 0.627 0.435 0.478 0.473 0.530
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 18
Sample of countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and the USA. Due to data
availability, Norway and Turkey are omitted in column (7), and Portugal
and Turkey in column (8).
ers, Stock and Watson, 2002, or Doménech and Gómez, 2006) is beyond the
scope of this paper, since it would require to take into account other potential
explanations proposed by this literature.
We read this evidence as indicating that the negative correlation between
government size and business cycles is a well established empirical fact. This
simple correlation between government size and volatility has been refined by
several recent studies. There have been attempts to clarify the origin of this
correlation. For example, Martinez-Mongay (2002) and Martinez-Mongay and
Sekkat (2003) have looked at which measure of government size captures this
correlation better (e.g., personal versus indirect taxes). Others have looked at
the possibility that the correlation of Table 1 is not linear and can be reversed
for large government size (Silgoner, Reitschuler, Crespo-Cuaresma, 2003). We
will ignore these refinements and simply postulate a model that can account
for the negative correlation observed in Table 1.
3 The model
As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that government size is negatively
correlated with the size of the business cycle is difficult to reconcile within
6
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a standard RBC model (Galí, 1994). The failure of the RBC framework to
replicate some basic features of the business cycle with respect to fiscal policy is
not unique to this stylized fact. For example, in the recent literature that looks
at the dynamic effects of fiscal policy changes (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002,
Fatás and Mihov, 2002, or Perotti, 2002) there is evidence that consumption
tends to respond positively to increases in government spending, a result that
does not square well with the predictions of the RBC model.
Both of these facts are easily explained by a simple textbook IS-LM model.
This simple static model predicts both that larger governments (if associated
to stronger automatic stabilizers) dampen the response of output to exogenous
technology shocks and that consumption increases when government spending
increases. In that sense, these results have a Keynesian flavor that speaks
in favor of the stabilizing role of government spending. This effect is also
present in large scale macroeconometric models (see van den Noord, 2000,
and Buti and van den Noord, 2004). Thus, our search for an explanation
starts with a basic dynamic general equilibrium model to which we add some
Keynesian features: nominal inertia and adjustments to investment costs. Our
model is very similar to the one proposed by Andrés and Doménech (2006)
and Linnemann and Schabert (2003), and also displays many features of the
analysis of Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), who attempt to provide a
theoretical explanation for the observed positive response of consumption to
government spending changes.
We now describe the main building blocks of the model, emphasizing the
assumptions that should help us account for the empirical results of Table 1.
7
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3.1 Firms and households
3.1.1 Price setting: nominal inertia
We consider a cashless economy that is populated by an infinite number of
firms. Each firm (indexed by i) faces a downward sloping demand curve for
its product (yi) with finite elasticity ε
yit = yt
µPit
Pt
¶−ε
(1)
where
∙R 1
0 (yit)
ε−1
ε di
¸ ε
ε−1
= yt and Pt =
hR 1
0 (Pit)
1−ε di
i 1
1−ε . We followWoodford
(2004 and 2005) and Christiano (2004), who have proposed a generalization to
Calvo’s (1983) model when capital and labour are firm-specific. Each period
a measure 1−φ of firms set their prices, ePit, to maximize the present value of
future profits,
maxePit Et
∞X
j=0
ρit,t+j(βφ)j
h ePitπjyit+j − Pt+jmcit,t+j(yit+j + κ)i (2)
subject to
yit+j =
³ ePitπ´−ε P εt+jyt+j (3)
where ρt,t+j is a price kernel representing the marginal utility value to the
representative household of an additional unit of profits accrued in period
t + j, β the discount factor, mct,t+j the marginal cost at t + j of the firm
changing prices at t and κ a fixed cost of production. The remaining (φ per
cent) firms set Pit = πPit−1 where π is the steady-state rate of inflation. We
shall further assume that capital cannot be instantaneously reallocated across
firms, so that, the marginal cost of firms adjusting prices (mcit,t) differs from
the average marginal cost at time t (mct). In this case, the coefficient which
measures the response of inflation (bπt, in deviations from steady state) to
changes in marginal costs (dmct, also in deviations) departs from the one in
the standard Calvo model since now it includes a new multiplicative term,
that is decreasing in the elasticity of demand ε: 3
bπt = βEtbπt+1 + (1− βφ)(1− φ)φ 1− φβκ1(1 + ε α
1−α)(1− φβκ1) +
α
1−αφβκ2
dmct (4)
3 A good intuition of why this happens is given by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004)
and Sbordone (2002). With costly adjustment of capital the marginal cost of a
firm is increasing in output. When there is an economy-wide shock that increases
marginal costs the firm will tend to raise prices and to reduce output. But the
reduction of output has a counteracting effect on marginal costs and then on prices.
This dampens the response of prices to an aggregate shock for a given value of the
parameter φ.
8
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where κ1 and κ2 are non-linear functions of the elasticity of output to cap-
ital (α), β, φ, ε and the capital adjusments costs we consider below, as in
Christiano (2004).
3.1.2 Capital and labor demand
The profit maximization problem of the ith intermediate good firm is given by
max
eit+j ,kit+j+1,lit+1
Et
∞X
j=0
ρt,t+jβj
Ã
(1− τkt+j)
"
Pit+j
Pt+j
yit+j − wit+jlit+j
#
− eit+j
!
(5)
subject to
kit+j+1 = Φ
Ã
eit+j
kit+j
!
kit+j + (1− δ)kit+j (6)
yit = Atkαitl
1−α
it − κ (7)
where τk is the tax rate over the firm’s profit, w is the wage, l is the amount of
specific labour hired by the firm and e the investment which accumulates into
the firm-specific capital, k. It is assumed that the variable At, which stands
for the total factor productivity, follows the process.
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + εat (8)
where εat is white noise and 0 < ρa < 1.
The accumulation of capital results from the firms’ investment decisions. Due
to installation costs Φ (eit/kit) only a proportion of investment spending goes
to increase the capital stockwhere δ is the constant depreciation rate. For the
installation costs we use the same function as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999). 4
From the first order conditions we have that
wit = (1− α)mcitAtkαitl−αit (9)
and
qit = Et
"
β
ρt,t+1
ρt,t
Ã
(1− τkt+1)rit+1 + qit+1
"
Φ
Ã
eit+1
kit+1
!
+ (1− δ)− Φ0
Ã
eit+1
kit+1
!
eit+1
kit+1
#!#
(10)
where qit is the Tobin’s q and rit is defined as
rit ≡ mcitαAtkα−1i l1−αi (11)
4 In particular, Φ
³
e¯
k¯
´
= δ, Φ0
³
e¯
k¯
´
= 1 and Θ = Φ
00
³
e¯
k¯
´
< 0.
9
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3.1.3 Households
The utility function of the representative jth household is non separable in
leisure (1− lt) and consumption (ct) and separable in public consumption (gct ),
as in Baxter and King (1993): 5
U1(ct, 1− lt, gct ) =
(ct(1− lt)γ)1−σ − 1
1− σ + Γ(g
c
t ) (13)
Households supply their labour to the intermediate firms, such that lt ≡Z 1
0
litdi and allocate their income (labor income and interest payments on bond
holdings (Bt), their share of profits of the firms (Ωit), and public transfers (gst )
to buy consumption and and to accumulate bonds for t+ 1:
Bt+1
(1 + it)
+ Pt(1 + τ ct )ct (14)
= Pt(1− τwt )
Z 1
0
witlitdi+Bt + Ptgst +
Z 1
0
Ωitdi
The tax structure also includes taxes on labor income (τwt ) and consumption
(τ ct ).
3.2 Equilibrium
The symmetric monopolistic competition equilibrium is defined as the set of
quantities that maximizes the constrained present value of the stream of utility
of the representative household and the constrained present value of the profits
earned by the representative firm, and the set of prices that clears the goods
markets, the labor market and the bonds and capital markets. The extensive
representation of the symmetric equilibrium is:
kit+1 = Φ
µeit
kit
¶
kit + (1− δ)kit (15)
5 We have checked the robustness of our results to changes in the specification of
the utility function, following Guo and Harrison (2006). In particular, these authors
consider two alternative utility functions. Their first specification (U2) is a particular
case of our utility function (U1) when σ = 1. In their second specification
U3 = ln ct −Υ3
l1+γgt
1 + γg
(12)
In our baseline economy the steady state value of lt is l = 1/3.We have chosen
γg = l/(1 − l) = 0.5 and Υ3 such that l = 1/3. The results presented in the
following sections are not very sensitive to the choice of this utility function.
10
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(1− τwt )
(1 + τ ct )
wit =
γct
(1− lit)
(16)
µtβ−1 = Et
Ã
µt+1
1 + it
πt+1
!
(17)
qit =
∙
Φ0
µeit
kit
¶¸−1
(18)
qit
β
= Et
(
µt+1
µt
Ã
(1− τkt+1)rit+1 + qit+1
"
Φ
Ã
eit+1
kit+1
!
+ (1− δ)− Φ0
Ã
eit+1
kit+1
!
eit+1
kit+1
#!)
(19)
wit = mcit(1− α)Atkαitl−αit (20)
rit = mcitαAtk
α−1
it l
1−α
it (21)
Et
∞X
j=0
ρt,t+j(βφ)
jP εt+jyt+j
∙
(1− ε)
³ ePitπ´ε + Pt+jmcit+jεπj ³πj ePit´−ε−1¸ = 0
(22)
Pt =
h
φ (πPt−1)
1−ε + (1− φ) eP 1−εt i 11−ε (23)
πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
(24)
Ptτwt
1Z
0
witlitdi+ Ptτkt
1Z
0
ritkitdi+ Ptτ ct ct − Pt(gct + gst ) = −
Bt+1
(1 + it)
+Bt (25)
yt ≡
1Z
0
yitdi = ct + et + g
c
t (26)
yit = Atk
α
itl
1−α
it − κ (27)
Etρt,t+j+1
Etρt,t+j
=
Etµt+j+1
Etµt+j
(28)
plus the equation relating the marginal costs of the price-adjusting firm (mcit,t+j)
with the average marginal costs (mct+j), and where µt in equation (28) is the
Lagrange multiplier of the intertemporal decision problem of the household.
The model is completed with the description of how the policy instruments
are set. The fiscal rules determine the path of gct and g
s
t . All τ
w
t , τ
k
t and τ
c
t
will be assumed constant for all t unless said otherwise. Monetary policy is
represented by a standard Taylor rule:
it = ρrit−1 + (1− ρr)i+ (1− ρr)ρπ(πt − π) + (1− ρr)ρy(byt − byNt ) + zit (29)
in which the monetary authority sets the interest rate (it) to prevent inflation
deviating from its steady-state level (πt − π) and to counteract movements in
the output gap (byt− byNt ) where byNt represents frictionless output (in deviations
from the steady-state); i is the steady-state interest rate and the current rate
moves smoothly (0 < ρr < 1) and has an unexpected component, zit.
11
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Provided that ρπ is above certain threshold value, fiscal policy must be de-
signed to satisfy the present value budget constraint of the public sector for
any price level in order to obtain a unique monetary equilibrium (Leeper,
1991, Woodford, 1997, Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2001). A simple way of making
this requirement operational is to assume that either taxes or public spending
respond sufficiently to the level of debt (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001).
These feedback rules also represent the quantitative deficit and/or debt targets
made explicit in most developed countries’ fiscal systems nowadays (Corsetti
and Roubini, 1996, Bohn, 1998, and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002).
The theoretical requirements of a Ricardian policy can be satisfied with a feed-
back behavior of either revenues or expenditures, but the empirical evidence
indicates that successful consolidations in industrialized countries have been
based on spending cuts (see von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch, 2001, Alesina and
Perotti, 1997). 6 For simplicity, in our baseline economy we assume that gct re-
mains constant over the business cycle and we use a fiscal rule in lump-sum
transfers (gs) as a function of the absolute deviations of public debt bt ≡ Bt/Pt
from its steady-state value b = 0 and, therefore, in the basic model private
agents decisions do not depend on public debt consolidation: 7
gst − gs
gs
' bgst = αsb ³bt − b´ (30)
3.3 Model parameterization
We obtain a numerical solution of the steady state as well as of the log-
linearized system. Table 2 summarizes the values of the baseline parameters.
Many parameters are similar to the ones used by Andrés and Doménech (2006),
allowing the model to reproduce the most salient facts of business cycles in
EMU as, for example, the relative volatility of consumption, investment or
correlation between the primary budget surplus and output. The model also
match the values of the private consumption and investment to GDP ratios
in steady state (c/y and e/y respectively) to the average values observed in
6 Cyclical changes in tax rates are not very realistic and may, under some circum-
stances, lead to multiple (sunspot) equilibria, thus inducing additional instability
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997).
7 In the model with ricardian consumers, since the consolidation of budget debt is
made through lump-sum transfers, the value of αsb in the fiscal rule has no effect
on the dynamics of the endogenous variables of the model except for public trans-
fers and public debt. In the model with rule-of-thumb consumers, public transfers
are a component of disposable income and then affect the consumption of these
consumers. We have set a low value for (αsb = 0.10), such that public debt is not
explosive but the effects of fiscal consolidation on the dynamics of RoT consumers
are minimal.
12
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Table 2
Calibration of baseline model
σ β γ α ε δ σa ρa
1.0 1.03−
1
4 1.295 0.40 6.0 0.021 0.0078 0.80
τw τk τ c gc/y gs/y ρr ρπ π
0.279 0.279 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.5 1.5 1.020.25
EMU from 1960 to 1999. 8 Thus, the relative risk aversion coefficient (σ) is
1.0, the discount factor (β) is 0.9926, following Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), and, since we assume that in the steady state households allocate 1/3
of their time to market activities (as in Cooley and Prescott, 1995), the share
of consumption in utility (γ) has been chosen to be 1.295.
The elasticity of output with respect to private capital (α) is 0.40, as in Cooley
and Prescott (1995). The depreciation rate (δ) is equal to 0.021 as estimated by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The standard deviation (σa) and the first
order autocorrelation coefficient (ρa) of the technology shock are set to 0.0167
and 0.80 respectively. Following Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (1997),
the elasticity of demand with respect to price (ε) is set to 6.0, consistent with
a steady-state mark-up, ε/(ε− 1), equal to 1.20. The fixed cost in production
(κ) is then solved as a function of y and ε to produce zero profits in the
steady-state:
κ =
y
ε− 1 (31)
Fiscal policy parameters have been set after computing the tax rates for OECD
countries using the method proposed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994).
Given these numbers, we assume for simplicity that there is a unique income
tax (τk = τw = 0.279) whereas consumption taxes (τ c) are equal to 0.10. For
the same sample of countries and years, government consumption over GDP
(gc/y) is 0.18 and transfers (gs/y) are 0.16. This calibration yields no public
debt in steady state, whereas the response of transfers to absolute deviations
of debt from its steady state is set at 0.1.
The last set of parameters refers to the interest rate rule. In the baseline
model, we set the autocorrelation coefficient of the interest rate (ρr) equal
to 0.5 and the response to inflation deviations from target (ρπ) equal to 1.5.
These values imply a response of the interest rate to inflation slightly quicker
8 Empirical evidence about EMU business cycles can be found in Agresti and Mojon
(2001).
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Table 3
Government size and output and consumption volatility
Output Consumption
σy σy
∂ lnσy
∂(G/Y ) σc σc
∂ lnσc
∂(G/Y )
η = 0.5 η = 1.5 η = 0.5 η = 1.5
Θ = φ = 0 4.658 4.582 -0.049 1.986 2.802 1.012
Θ = 0, φ = 0.75 4.952 4.735 -0.132 2.071 2.856 0.944
Θ = 0.25, φ = 0 3.496 3.133 -0.323 2.502 3.036 0.568
Θ = 0.25, φ = 0.75 1.709 1.337 -0.723 1.386 1.446 0.124
and less aggressive than the one usually estimated for EMU countries (see,
Doménech, Ledo and Taguas, 2002). The steady-state level of gross inflation
(π) is set to 1.020.25, that is, the target level of the ECB. The model with
supply shocks has been simulated 100 times, producing 200 observations. We
take the last 100 observations and compute the steady-sate value (x) and
the standard deviation of each endogenous variable (σx). To avoid spurious
correlation, we do not filter the simulated data (see Cogley and Nason, 1995).
4 Government size and output volatility.
We have simulated the model under different configurations of parameters to
assess how the size of the government affects the volatility of output. Govern-
ment size will be captured by a parameter η that will scale both expenditures
and revenues so that the steady state budget remains balanced. In other words,
we will start with a baseline economy (b) and we will then look at transfor-
mations (j) in which government expenditures and tax rates are proportional
to those of the benchmark model (τ ib and g
i
b respectively):
τ ij = ητ
i
b
gij/yj = ηg
i
b/yb
where 0.5 ≤ η ≤ 1.5, implying that the output share of total government
expenditures changes from 0.17 to 0.51.
The first three columns of Table 3 present the standard deviation of output
as well as its semi-elasticity, ∂ lnσy/∂(G/Y ), as we change government size
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for different configurations of parameters. We present this semi-elasticity to be
able to do a quick comparison with the results of Table 1 where the coefficients
of the first row can be read also as semi-elasticities. 9
The four economies of Table 3 differ in their degree of price rigidities (φ) and
in the size of the adjustment costs to capital (that is, parameter Θ which
is the second derivative of the installation costs function). In the case where
Θ = φ = 0.0 we have a standard RBC model with no price rigidities or
adjustment costs to investment. In this case we obtain results which are similar
to the findings of Galí (1994). As government size increases, output volatility
barely changes.
We now introduce nominal rigidities and costs of adjustment to investment
to add Keynesian features to the economy. As expected, adding rigidities to
the model makes the economy less volatile. This effect is mainly driven by
the adjustment costs to capital, as can be seen by comparing rows 1 and 3
in Table 3. A comparison of rows 1 and 2 shows that the rigidity of prices
can make the economy more volatile by itself. We are not interested in the
overall volatility of output but on how this volatility changes as we change
government size. We can see this effect by either comparing columns 1 and 2,
which are calculated by two different sizes of government, or by looking at the
next column that contains the semi-elasticity of output volatility with respect
to government size.
What can be seen as we move down through rows 2 to 4, is that, with rigidi-
ties, the volatility of output decreases as we increase government size. In other
words, adding rigidities to the RBC economy allows us to generate impor-
tant stabilizing effects from government size. And these stabilizing effects are
directly linked to the degree of rigidities present in the economy: as these
rigidities increase this correlation becomes even more negative (i.e., larger in
absolute size). For example, in the case where Θ = 0.25, a value which repro-
duce the relative volatility of investment to output in EMU, and φ = 0.75,
in line with the estimates of Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) for the
euro area, the semi-elasticity of output volatility to government size is −0.25,
approximately half of the estimated semi-elasticity in Table 1.
In Figure 1 we generalize the results of Table 1 by displaying this semi-
elasticity as a function of the values for two key parameters: the degree of nom-
inal rigidities (φ) and capital adjustment costs (Θ). We observe a monotonic
9 It is important to notice that in the linear approximation of the model the semi-
elasticity of output and consumption volatilities to government size are invariant
to the choice of the standard deviation of technology shocks (σz). Additionally, our
simulations indicate that ∂ lnσ/∂(G/Y ) is not affected by changes in G/Y within
the range usually observed in the data, that is, the response of lnσ to changes in
G/Y is linear.
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negative relationship between this semi-elasticity and the degree of rigidities
in the model. As rigidities increase, this semi-elasticity decreases.
4.1 Why do larger governments have less volatile business cycles?
We now turn to the intuition of the results. What is the reason for the stabi-
lizing effect of larger governments in our simulated economy? To understand
this issue, we have looked at how the volatilities of different components of
GDP change when government size changes. The last three columns of Table
3 present the volatility of consumption as well as the semi-elasticity of this
volatility relative to government size. Figure 2 generalizes the analysis to a
wide range of parameter values for φ and Θ.
The results for consumption are similar to those for output. For all parameters
values we find that as we add rigidities to the model, the semi-elasticity de-
creases. But the difference with our previous results is that the semi-elasticity
of consumption volatility never turns negative. In other words, it is always the
case, for all parameter values considered, that government size has a destabiliz-
ing effect on consumption (i.e., the volatility of consumption always increases
as governments become larger), although this effect becomes smaller as we
increase the degree of rigidities. Although not reported in the table, the same
effect is present when we look at investment. Therefore, for all parameter
values considered so far, larger governments reduce the volatility of output
only because of a composition effect. It is because government spending is
not volatile itself and that we are increasing the size of the (non-volatile)
component of GDP that the overall volatility decreases.
Why does consumption and investment volatility increase when G/Y in-
creases? This is a result that is already present in Galí (1994). Higher volatility
comes as a result of an increase in the investment multiplier because a higher
G/Y implies a lower steady-state level of the capital-to-output ratio. A low
level of capital relative to output implies a larger response of investment to
changes in productivity. This is also the effect that justifies the larger increase
in consumption, because of the more pronounced response of investment, the
associated increase in wealth leads to a larger response of consumption.
As regards hours and wages, the empirical response of these two variables to
productivity shocks is a much debated issue in the literature. Some of the re-
cent empirical work in this area has established the result that hours tend to
fall on impact following a positive technology shock (see, for example, Rotem-
berg, 2003, or Galí, 1999). 10 While this result is at odds with a standard
10 The response of hours after a technology shock is under an intense empirical
debate. See Rebelo (2005) and the references therein for further details.
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RBC model, it can easily be accommodated within a model with significant
nominal rigidities as discussed by Gali (1999). The intuition is simple. With
the money supply being fixed (or not too accommodative), and sticky prices
firms face constant demand and this means, for a higher level of productivity,
that employment has to go down. In economies with substantial rigidities, real
wages fall on impact for very much the same reasons as employment does in
the presence of technology shocks. The response of real wages is the standard
one as labor demand temporarily falls along an upward sloping labor supply
curve. Despite this short-run fall on labor income consumption should not fall
if consumers are forward looking since permanent income rises as a result of
the technology shock. This is what we observe in our calibrations as well. In
the absence of rigidities, hours and real wages increase after a productivity
shock. With a high-enough degree of nominal rigidities the response of wages
and hours becomes the opposite as in Gali (1999). But, still, consumption
increases as long as forward looking consumers anticipate increases in income.
Automatic stabilizers associated to large governments smooth disposable in-
come in the periods that follow the productivity shock, but they have very
little effect on the dynamics of consumption.
Changes in the elasticity of labor supply also contribute to increase the volatil-
ity of private output. Higher G/Y implies a lower steady-state level of em-
ployment, which will make the response of hours larger. 11 This effect gets
partially compensated in our model by a wealth effect that goes in the oppo-
site direction: lower wealth leads to a lower elasticity of labor supply.
It is important to stress that, as we indicated above, despite the fact that our
model predicts destabilizing effects of government size on consumption and
investment volatility, this effect gets weaker in economies where rigidities are
larger. In other words, there is also an interesting interaction between govern-
ment size and rigidities when it comes to the volatility of consumption and
investment. Without rigidities (the RBC model) larger governments increase
the volatility of consumption and investment by a larger amount than in the
economy with rigidities. As a result, the stabilizing effect of higher G/Y, which
is identical for all simulations via the composition effect, more than compen-
sates the increase in consumption and investment volatility that results from
the increase in G/Y only in the case of an economy with strong rigidities.
11 The elasticity of labor supply, holding consumption constant, depends on steady
state hours. Using the first order conditions we can derive this elasticity as:
∂blt
∂ bwt
¯¯¯¯
¯
c
=
µ
l
1 + l
+
i
1 + i
¶−1
This elasticity is decreasing in l. Hence, the response of labor supply to changes in
real wages is stronger in economies with higher labor taxes (lower l).
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Table 4
Sensitivity to parameter changes
Output Consumption
σy σy
∂ lnσy
∂(G/Y ) σc σc
∂ lnσc
∂(G/Y )
η = 0.5 η = 1.5 η = 0.5 η = 1.5
σ = 2 1.399 1.066 -0.800 0.734 0.722 -0.050
γ = 0.63 2.014 1.619 -0.643 1.637 1.759 0.211
αyg = −1.0 1.613 1.111 -1.095 1.441 1.557 0.227
σ = 2, γ = 2.0,
αyg = −1.0
1.206 0.804 -1.191 0.712 0.697 -0.062
Why does the response of investment and consumption become less dependent
on government size in the presence of rigidities? The intuition is similar to what
we described in previous paragraphs. More rigidities generally lead to a lower
response of investment to productivity shocks. As this multiplier goes down,
it also becomes less responsive to changes in government size. In summary,
while larger governments make the response of investment to productivity
more pronounced, this effect is smaller for economies with more rigidities.
The behavior of consumption follows that of investment.
Are our results dependent on the parameter values? We have conducted some
sensitivity tests by changing some of the parameter values in the utility func-
tion (σ, γ) and/or in the response of public consumption (which was acyclical
in our benchmark). 12 Results are displayed in Table 4. In all cases, the main
results remain virtually unchanged. The volatility of output goes down in all
cases (and by a similar amount) as government size increases. When it comes
to the volatility of consumption, the results are slightly different as, under
some parameter values, the volatility of consumption also goes down when
government size increases. But this decline is still smaller than what we ob-
served in the data.
In summary, these preliminary results show that the model with real and
12 In order to have a countercyclical public consumption we add the following fiscal
rule to the model: bgct = αcybyt (32)
If αcy is negative public consumption decreases when output augments.
18
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    25   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0710
nominal rigidities is partially able to account for the empirical evidence about
volatility and government size. While it can account for some of the stabilizing
effects on output volatility, it cannot justify the stabilizing effect that we also
observe empirically on consumption. We now explore an extension of the model
that can help us match this behavior.
4.2 Introducing rule-of-thumb consumers
We now consider that only a proportion of consumers can borrow and lend
in the financial markets, whereas others are restricted in the sense that they
choose consumption and leisure to maximize utility on a period-by-period
basis. 13 By looking at this class of consumers that cannot borrow or lend but
simply spend all their current income, we hope to uncouple the dynamics of
investment and wealth from that of consumption. In that sense, the response
of consumption for those individuals should closer mimic that of GDP.
A proportion (λ) of consumers will spend all of their current income as con-
sumption while the rest will follow the same optimizing behavior as in the
previous version of the model. Representing by crt, lrt and cot, lot consumption
and labor supply of restricted and optimizing consumers respectively, rule-of-
thumb consumers face the following budget restriction,
Pt(1 + τ ct )crt = Pt(1− τwt )
Z 1
0
witlrit + Ptλgst
Solving now the model, after the aggregation of the optimality conditions for
both types of consumer, the equilibrium described by the previous equations
(15) to (28) includes two new conditions
ct =
λ
(1 + τ ct )
"
(1− τwt )wt
1 + γ
+
λgst
1 + γ
#
+ (1− λ)cot (33)
lt =
λ
1 + γ
"
1− γλg
s
t
(1− τwt )wt
#
+ (1− λ)lot (34)
whereas the Euler equation (17) now changes to
1 = βEt
Ã
(1 + τ ct )c
−σ
ot+1(1− lot+1)γ(1−σ)
(1 + τ ct+1)c
−σ
ot (1− lot)γ(1−σ)
1 + it
πt+1
!
(35)
Results for models with rule-of-thumb consumers are shown in Table 5, which
is identical in structure to Table 3. Moving down across rows we see how, in
13 These are ’rule-of-thumb’ consumers in Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) ter-
minology.
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Table 5
Government size and volatility with λ = 0.65
Output Consumption
σy σy
∂ lnσy
∂(G/Y ) σc σc
∂ lnσc
∂(G/Y )
η = 0.5 η = 1.5 η = 0.5 η = 1.5
Θ = φ = 0.0 4.046 4.104 0.042 2.169 2.812 0.763
Θ = 0.0, φ = 0.75 4.348 4.284 -0.044 2.488 2.947 0.498
Θ = 0.25, φ = 0.0 3.372 3.001 -0.343 2.608 3.118 0.525
Θ = 0.25, φ = 0.75 1.852 1.062 -1.636 2.934 1.028 -3.084
an economy with a substantial proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers (λ =
0.65), the stabilizing effect of large governments shows up more clearly. 14
Unlike in the model in the previous section, now as government size increases,
consumption becomes less volatile. As a result, the stabilizing effect on output
that we had documented in Table 3 becomes now much stronger. For example,
in the last row we see that the semi-elasticity of output volatility with respect
to government size is now −0.44, which is substantially larger than what we
found in Table 3 and close to the empirical estimates of Table 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the role of rule-of-thumb consumers in the calibrations.
The share of this class of consumers does not have a large effect on the volatil-
ity of output and its semi-elasticity except above certain level of price rigidities
and capital adjustment costs. In other words, the presence of rule-of-thumb
consumers only makes a difference in economies with strong nominal and real
rigidities. In fact, when φ and Θ are close to zero, as in a RBCmodel, the value
of λ does not affect the standard deviation of private consumption. Therefore,
it is the interaction between those rigidities and the share of restricted con-
sumers that decreases consumption volatility.
Understanding the intuition behind this result is crucial to have a complete
picture of the mechanisms that explain why larger governments are associ-
ated with reduced consumption volatility. Because constrained consumers will
spend all their current income, we need to understand how hours and wages
change in response to productivity shocks and how this response is affected
14A value of λ = 0.65 is in the higher range of the estimates in the literature (see,
for example, Weber, 2002, Table 1). Most of these empirical studies refers to the
US economy.
20
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    27    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0710
by the size of government and rigidities. Unlike forward looking households,
that were able to spend out of their expected future income, rule-of-thumb
consumers are forced to reduce their consumption along with their current la-
bor income in the first quarters after the technology shock. This explains the
behavior of consumption given a government size, but how does this behavior
change when we increase government size? Higher income taxes contribute
to soften the income fall in the periods that follow the productivity shock.
By moderating the fall in labor income of the rule-of-thumb consumers, large
governments also moderate the fall in their consumption and, as a result,
consumption becomes less volatile. Also, as the size of government increases
the marginal rate of labor taxes augments making labor supply more elastic,
which implies a lower response of wages. In fact, the reduction in the volatility
of wages when RoT consumers and rigidities are present is very large in our
simulations. This lower response of wages also explains the smaller change
of consumption for the constrained consumers. 15 In summary, larger govern-
ments stabilize consumption by stabilizing employment, wages and income for
those consumers who are constrained, making total consumption and output
less volatile.
5 Conclusions
How effective are automatic stabilizers? Does fiscal policy smooth economic
fluctuations? These are open questions at the forefront of public and policy
debates on the role of fiscal policy. Empirical evidence suggests that large gov-
ernments have a stabilizing effect on consumption and output, that is, coun-
tries with large governments display less volatile business cycles. Our analysis
starts by taking this stylized fact as given and analyzes from a theoretical point
of view which type of models can explain the observed negative correlation
between government size and volatility. Understanding the exact mechanisms
through which fiscal policy interacts with the business cycle is necessary to
extract policy implications out of that empirical fact. At the same time, we
also provide a test of alternative models of the business cycle by testing them
against a very specific and well defined prediction: that large governments
stabilize output.
In our analysis we find that a variety of frictions are necessary to replicate
the empirical evidence. A standard RBC model with technology shocks can-
not produce the negative correlation that exists between government size and
output volatility in the data.
15Additionally, in the economy with RoT consumers and rigidities the response of
investment volatility to increase in the government size is negative (-0.52), partially
explaining the empirical evidence shown in Table 1.
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We find that the volatility of output falls with the rise of government size
provided that the economy features enough nominal and real rigidities. As
prices changes are less frequent and capital adjustment costs are larger, we
find that the semi-elasticity of output volatility to government size becomes
more negative and significant as compared with the RBC model, in which this
semi-elasticity is practically zero. In our initial baseline model, this reduced
volatility is mostly coming via a composition effect. As the size of the gov-
ernment increases, it is still the case that both consumption and investment
become more volatile but, because the non-volatile component of output is
becoming larger, total volatility decreases.
While this result is encouraging, it does not explain sufficiently empirical facts
because we also observe in the data that consumption is less volatile when gov-
ernment size increases. To address this deficiency of the model, we introduce
rule-of-thumb consumers. We find that in this case both the volatility of out-
put and consumption fall with the rise of the government size provided that
these rigidities and the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers are both suf-
ficiently large. We show that both these features are needed in a dynamic
general equilibrium model to mimic the correlations observed in the data.
Our results show that models with Keynesian features can better replicate
the empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy on the volatility of out-
put fluctuations. The spirit of our analysis is similar to recent attempts to
explain other stylized facts of fiscal policy (such as the positive response of
consumption to increases in government spending) that also require models
that combine nominal and real rigidities with rule-of-thumb consumers.
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Fig. 1. The semielasticity of output volatility to government size (∂ lnσ/∂(G/Y ))
as a function of nominal and real rigidities when public consumption is acyclical.
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Fig. 2. The semielasticity of consumption volatility to government size
(∂ lnσ/∂(G/Y )) as a function of nominal and real rigidities when public consump-
tion is acyclical.
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Fig. 3. Output and consumption semi-elasticity as a function of λ, nominal
rigidities and capital adjustment costs.
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